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MAJORITY-LATINO DISTRICTS
AND LATINO POLITICAL POWER
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1

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) was aimed at ensuring that
all citizens, and in particular African Americans, have equal
opportunity to participate in the political process. Initial enforcement
focused on eliminating tools of Black disenfranchisement that had
developed over the previous century: grandfather clauses, literacy
tests, poll taxes, and discriminatory administration of “understanding
clause” rules that disenfranchised literate Blacks. In 1970, provisions
were added to the VRA to protect against Black vote dilution,
whereby individuals were physically allowed to vote but those votes
2
were manipulated so as to deny Blacks a meaningful voice. Although
not specifically mentioned in the VRA, majority-minority districts
have often been used to satisfy the law’s mandate to ensure that all
3
citizens are able “to elect representatives of their choice.” Majorityminority districts are those where a majority of residents are members
of a historically underrepresented group, such as Blacks or Latinos.
Scholars have consistently found that these majority-minority districts
increase Black representation in Congress as well as in state and local
4
legislatures, and that these districts further benefit African
Americans by contributing to increased trust in government and
5
increased civic engagement. African Americans continue to rely on
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1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973–1973bb (West 2010).
2. See generally DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES: CONSEQUENCES OF
THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1998) (documenting the history of the VRA).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b).
4. Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress? 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794–812 (1996);
David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of ‘Do
Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?’ 93 AM.
POL. SCI. REV.183, 183–86 (1999); Susan Welch, The Impact of At-Large Elections on the
Representation of Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL., 1050, 1056–65 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Race, Sociopolitical Participation,
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majority-minority districts for their electoral success and equitable
representation, particularly in the South.
The VRA has also been used to ensure that Latinos are
adequately represented. Although some aspects of the original
VRA—Section 4(e), for example—were meant to benefit Puerto
Ricans in New York, its relevance for Latinos increased markedly
6
with the 1975 extension to cover language minorities. Results from
the 1980 Census were used to create majority-Latino districts that
later led to increased Latino representation, often including areas
where lines had previously been drawn so as to dilute Latino vote
7
strength. Particularly during the post-1990 Census round of
redistricting, lines were drawn to maximize the election of both Black
and Latino members of Congress. As a consequence, most Latino
members of Congress today owe their seats to the creation of
majority-Latino districts. As is the case for African Americans, the
Latino community has reaped benefits from majority-Latino districts
beyond descriptive representation, including increased substantive
representation, increased civic engagement, and increased feelings of
8
political trust and efficacy.
Discussions about the current and continued value of these
districts are complicated by the fact that most analyses do not
distinguish between Black and Latino majority-minority districts and
populations. Those who argue that majority-minority districts are
crucial for the election of Black and Latino representatives make
several assumptions: 1) racial polarization remains strong enough to
otherwise deny Blacks and Latinos the opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice; 2) Blacks and Latinos are monolithic
groups that vote as a bloc; and 3) there is value in having elected
officials who descriptively represent their constituents. In other words,
both communities are often lumped together as treated as “minority”
and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377, 383-84, 387–88 (1990) (concluding
political empowerment of blacks leads to increased civic engagement, trust, and political
efficacy).
6. Juan Cartagena, Latinos and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Beyond Black and
White, 18 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 201, 204–05, 211–15 (2004).
7. Luis Ricardo Fraga, Prototype from the Midwest: Latinos in Illinois, in FROM
RHETORIC TO REALITY: LATINO POLITICS IN THE 1988 ELECTIONS 111, 117–25 (Rodolfo O. de
la Garza & Louis DeSipio eds., 1992).
8. Matt A. Barreto, Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, The Mobilizing Effect of
Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004); Adrian D.
Pantoja & Gary M. Segura, Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures
and Political Alienation Among Latinos, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 441, 443–44, 455–57 (2003).
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voters and many observers fail to note the distinctive political
contexts and realities of each. In fact, the level of racial polarization
against Black and Latino candidates differs, and the two groups
display dissimilar levels of political unity. In addition, Black and
Latino communities have unique demographic and geographic
histories. Thus, any discussion of the future of majority-minority
districts must analyze separately how best to ensure compliance with
the VRA and the full extension of rights of citizenship to Blacks and
Latinos. This article examines the history and political realities of
Latinos in the United States, including their experiences with
majority-Latino districts, and concludes that the Latino community
continues to need these districts for reasons distinct from those of the
Black community.
LATINOS AND THE VRA
Two sections of the VRA, combined with subsequent judicial
interpretations and amendments, have led to the creation and
proliferation of majority-minority districts. Section 2 prohibits policies
or practices that give minorities “less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice,” and applies to the entire
9
country. Section 5 requires state and local jurisdictions with a history
of discrimination to acquire federal preclearance for changes to their
voting laws and practices in order to confirm that any proposed
changes do “not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” or
10
membership in a language minority group. In 1969, the Supreme
Court interpreted the VRA to also protect against the dilution of
11
minority votes. Additionally, the 1970 reauthorization of a ban on
literacy tests led in 1975 to the extension of the VRA to cover
language minorities, as Congress determined that failing to provide
in-language materials to citizens not proficient in English constituted
12
illegal literacy tests.
Interpretation of section 5 was significantly changed by the
13
Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft. Writing for the
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b) (West 2010).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(c).
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
HUDSON, supra note 2, at 109–11.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
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majority, Justice O’Connor expanded the definition of the right of
voters to “elect representatives of their choice” to include both
districts where it is “highly likely” that this right will be protected as
14
well as districts where it is “perhaps not quite as likely.” As Alvaro
Bedoya notes,
After Georgia v. Ashcroft covered jurisdictions could secure
preclearance even if they had “unpacked” majority-minority
districts to create “coalitional districts,” where minority groups
depend on coalitions with other voters to elect their candidates of
choice, or “influence districts,” where minority voters are not able
to elect their candidates of choice, but could be swing voters in an
election. Prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft, preclearance for those
15
jurisdictions would have been highly unlikely.

In reaching this decision, Georgia v. Ashcroft cited five political
science studies that showed both decreased racial polarization and
that influence and coalitional districts were the best way to maximize
16
minority voting strength. Yet, all five studies noted by Georgia v.
17
Ashcroft focused on Black voting power.
Conclusions based on studies of Black political power do not
necessarily speak to the political realities of other communities.
Blacks and Latinos are both historically underrepresented minority
groups in the United States and share a history of racism and
discrimination, but a number of questions should be considered
before assuming that they benefit equally from majority-minority
districts. Are the political realities faced by Latinos similar to those
18
faced by Blacks? How willing are White voters to vote for Latino
candidates? Are Latinos a cohesive voting bloc, or are they divided
along partisan lines? To what degree are Latinos currently able to
14. Id. at 480.
15. Alvaro Bedoya, Note, The Unforeseen Effects of Georgia v. Ashcroft on the Latino
Community, 115 YALE L.J. 2112, 2116–17 (2006) (footnote omitted).
16. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482–83.
17. CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF
AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 193–234 (1995); Cameron et al., supra note 4, at 808;
Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley & David Lublin, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A
Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Lublin,
supra note 4, at 185 ; Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself? Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1517 (2002).
18. This discussion generally follows previous research in considering Black and Latino
politics as distinct; however, as noted by Tony Affigne, there has always been an Afro-Latino
component to the Latino community, particularly in the Northeast, and their presence is
increasing due to patterns of internal migration and increased immigration from nations with
large African-descent populations such as the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Ecuador.
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elect Latino representatives, and how are they limited in this ability
due to low turnout? Can Latinos elect a Latino candidate in a district
where they do not constitute a majority or supermajority of the
population, or are majority-minority districts key to the continued
protection and growth of Latino political power? The following
sections of this article address these questions in order to better
understand the continuing role of majority-minority districts in
providing equal opportunity to Latinos in the United States.
RACIAL POLARIZATION
Notwithstanding Barack Obama’s historic victories in the
majority-White Democratic Party caucus in Iowa and the general
election of November 2008, there is considerable evidence that racial
animosity towards Black candidates by White voters persists to this
19
day, particularly in the South. Latino candidates, however, have a
very different relationship with White voters. Their presence does not
provoke the same “racial threat” response among Whites as does the
20
presence of African Americans. According to Luis Fraga and
Ricardo Ramírez, in the California State Assembly elections of 1992,
1994, 1996 and 1998, Latinos were elected in every district where
21
Latinos were at least 40% of the electorate. Expanding this research
with a national dataset and updated election results, Jason Casellas
finds that “it takes more African Americans in a district to increase
the probability of electing African American legislators than it does
22
for Latinos.”
The research in this area is limited, yet several studies find that
White voters are generally willing to vote for Latino candidates. As
noted by Marylee Taylor in her examination of the 1990 General

19. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Charles Tien & Richard Nadeau, Obama’s Missed Landslide: A
Racial Cost? 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 69, 72–75 (2010); D. Stephen Voss & David Lublin, Black
Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections, 29 AM. POL. RES.
141, 172–74 (2001).
20. See J. Eric Oliver & Janelle Wong, Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings, 47 AM.
J. OF POL. SCI. 567, 568–69, 579–81 (2003) (reviewing ethnic populations’ attitudes towards
other ethnic populations); Marylee C. Taylor, How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial
Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count, 63 AM. SOC. REV., 512, 531–33 (1998)
(examining white attitudes towards minority populations).
21. Luis Fraga & Ricardo Ramírez, Continuity and Change: Latino Political Incorporation
in California Since 1990, in 3 RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA (Bruce Cain &
Sandra Bass eds., 2008).
22. Jason Casellas, Coalitions in the House? The Election of Minorities to State Legislatures
and Congress, 62 POL. RES. Q. 1, 6 (2008).
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Social Survey, where she finds much less racial animosity among
Whites towards Latinos than towards Blacks, those who lump
minority groups together should be sensitive to the “unique position
23
of blacks in U.S. society.” Exploiting a natural experiment in the 2001
municipal elections in Los Angeles, Marisa Abrajano, Jonathan
Nagler and R. Michael Alvarez find that White (and Latino) voters
used issues and ideology, and not just ethnic identity, to make vote
24
choices between White and Latino candidates.
Casellas looks at the election of Latinos to the California state
legislature both before and after the post-2000 Census round of
25
redistricting. In 1990, Latinos constituted 25% of the state’s
population but held only 5% of seats in the state Assembly and
Senate. Just ten years later, Latino representation had grown to more
than 20% of the state legislature, while their share of the population
had grown to about a third. More interesting are the conclusions that
can be reached by closer examination of just which seats are held by
Latinos, and the degree to which these reflect the creation of
majority-Latino districts. Before the poast-2000 Census round of
redistricting, Latinos held twenty-five seats in the California state
legislature but only three of those seats belonged to majority-Latino
districts. After the redistricting, the total number of Latino legislators
grew to twenty-nine, but now twenty were from majority-Latino
districts. Casellas notes: “Latino candidates are more likely to run in
districts with higher percentages of Latinos because their chances of
26
winning increase.” Still, he concludes that while Latinos are most
likely to win in majority-Latino districts, they are also increasingly
viable candidates in non-majority Latino districts. While African
Americans in California continue to have difficulty winning in mixedrace districts, Latinos in mixed Latino-White districts often form
coalitions with White voters to elect Latino representatives,
paralleling multi-city findings from research several decades ago by
27
Rufus Browning, Dale Marshall and David Tabb.
23. Taylor, supra note 20, at 531.
24. Marisa A. Abrajano, Jonathan Nagler & R. Michael Alvarez, A Natural Experiment of
Race-Based and Issue Voting: The 2001 City of Los Angeles Elections, 58 POL. RES. Q. 203, 215–
16 (2005).
25. Jason P. Casellas, The Elections of Latinos to the California Legislature Pre- and Post2000 Redistricting, 11 CAL. POL. & POL’Y 21–37 (2007).
26. Id. at 23.
27. RUFUS P. BROWNING, DALE R. MARSHALL & DAVID H. TABB, PROTEST IS NOT
ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 17–
135 (1984).
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In subsequent research expanding his scope to include other
states, Casellas finds that Latinos are better able to win election in
states with citizen legislators and legislatures with high turnover
28
rates. Examining data from 1992 to 2004, including state legislatures
and Congress, he finds that while “percentage Latino” is a strong
predictor of the election of a Latino candidate, institutions with low
levels of turnover (e.g. high incumbency rates) are less likely to elect
Latinos. In other words, because of California’s high turnover rates
(due in part to strict term limits), there are increased opportunities for
Latinos to win elections even when they do not constitute a majority
29
of a particular district. Casellas notes that
when Latinos are represented in large numbers in a state
legislature, even white voters become more willing to support
Latino candidates for statewide offices. For example, Bill
Richardson (D-NM) was elected governor in a state with a large
Latino population (43%) precisely because of his ability to appeal
30
to both Latino and white voters in the state.

One complication to studies evaluating the ability of Latinos to
win in mixed race/ethnicity districts is the issue of self-selection. The
tendency for Latinos to represent majority-Latino districts may be a
reflection of their lack of competitiveness in majority-White districts,
or it may be a reflection of the lack of attempts to win election in
majority-White districts. How can we accurately measure the ability
of Latinos to win votes from non-Latino neighborhoods if they don’t
usually even try? Casellas finds that when Latinos try to win in these
districts, they are less successful than Latino candidates in majorityLatino districts but still often win elections. This parallels studies of
gender in politics, in that women are less likely to win elected office
but also less likely to compete; thus, the underrepresentation of
women in elected office reflects a combination of the reluctance of
voters to support women but also the absence of women on the
28. Jason P. Casellas, The Institutional and Demographic Determinants of Latino
Representation, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 399, 418 (2009).
29. Id. See also Susan J. Carroll & Krista Jenkins, Increasing Diversity or More of the
Same? Term Limits and the Representation of Minorities, Women, and Minority Women in State
Legislatures, 10 NAT’L POL. SCI. REV. 71, 81–82 (2005). Carroll and Jenkins note that the
pattern is very different for African Americans and Latinos, in that African Americans are
better able to capture seats in majority-Black districts once long-term White incumbents are
termed out, while for Latinos the open seats created via term limits allow them to also win seats
in majority-White districts where Latinos may constitute only a small minority of the
population.
30. Casellas, supra note 28, at 404.
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31

ballot. More Latinos would be elected if they were more often
32
recruited and supported by political parties and interest groups.
The relative lack of racial animosity towards Latinos should not
be overstated; considerable discrimination against Latinos and
attempts to limit Latino voting power persist to this day. As recently
as 2006, intervention by the Supreme Court was needed to prevent
Texas elected officials from unconstitutionally diluting Latino vote
33
strength. Until the 1950s, there were virtually no Latino elected
officials in the United States. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 1975
extension to language minorities, and subsequent litigation to protect
those rights by Latino civil rights organizations have been crucial to
the expansion of Latino political power and representation. While
thousands of Latinos have since won elected office, the number of
Latino elected officials today is still “woefully discrepant” with the
34
size of the population. At 15.4% of the population (as of 2008),
Latinos would need to hold sixty-seven seats in the U.S. House of
Representatives to achieve proportional representation. They
currently hold twenty-five, most of which are in districts where
Latinos are at least 50% of the population, as shown in Table 1. In
contrast, Blacks are 12.1% of the population and hold forty-two seats
35
(10%) in the House.

31. Richard L. Fox & Jennifer L. Lawless, Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to
Run for Office, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 264, 274–75 (2004); Jennifer L. Lawless & Richard L. Fox, If
Only They’d Ask: Gender, Recruitment, and Political Ambition, 72 J. POL. (forthcoming 2010);
Jennifer L. Lawless & Kathryn Pearson, The Primary Reason for Women's
Underrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom, 70 J. POL. 67, 76–78 (2008).
32. See Henry E. Brady, Kay Lehman Schlozman & Sidney Verba, Prospecting for
Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists, 93 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 153 (1999) (noting that recruitment of candidates is often biased so that the people
recruited have traits similar to the recruiters); Gary F. Moncrief, Recruitment and Retention in
U. S. Legislatures, 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 173, 174–84 (1999) (surveying studies that show the
importance of recruiting candidates).
33. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); see also
Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1163 (2007) (arguing that “the
application of distinct doctrines to invalidate or diminish what are indisputably partisan
gerrymanders . . . may well have salutary effects”).
34. KIM GERON, LATINO POLITICAL POWER 7 (2005).
35. Three hundred thirty-two members are White (76%) and five are Asian (1%).
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Table 1
Latino Members of the 111th U.S. House of Representatives36
Representative

District

John Salazar

CO-3

Lucille Roybal-Allard

% Latino

Representative

District

% Latino

22.5

Mario Diaz-Balart

FL-25

67.9

CA-34

36.1

Loretta Sanchez

CA-47

68.7

Ben Ray Luján

NM-3

38.2

Xavier Becerra

CA-31

69.0

Nydia Velázquez

NY-12

46.2

Charles Gonzalez

TX-20

69.8

Devin Nunes

CA-21

48.5

Solomon Ortiz

TX-27

71.6

Albio Sires

NJ-13

49.3

Luis Gutierrez

IL-4

72.4

Dennis Cardoza

CA-18

50.1

Lincoln Diaz-Balart

FL-21

73.5

Raúl Grijalva

AZ-7

54.6

Grace F. Napolitano

CA-38

75.2

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

FL-18

64.8

Henry Cuellar

TX-28

78.8

Linda Sanchez

CA-39

65.0

Rubén Hinojosa

TX-15

79.8

Ciro Rodriguez

TX-23

65.5

Joe Baca

CA-43

80.2

Ed Pastor

AZ-4

66.3

Silvestre Reyes

TX-16

80.9

José Serrano

NY-16

66.4

Of the twenty-five House seats currently held by Latinos, over
half are in California (eight) and Texas (six). This parallels the
geographic concentration of Latinos in those states, but also illustrates
the difficulties faced by Latino candidates who may choose to run in
districts where there is not a majority-Latino population. Of the
twenty-five current Latino House members, only six represent nonmajority-Latino districts.
Even in California, racial polarization in voting persists; “the
legacy of prejudice and discrimination against Latinos still hangs
37
heavy over the political process.” Scholars looking at elections in Los
Angeles County from 1998 to 2003 find persistent evidence of racially
polarized voting against Latino candidates by White voters, and
36. This data was compiled from the United States House of Representatives and U.S.
Census
Bureau,
American
Community
Survey,
2006-2008,
available
at
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/. Florida Representatives are Republicans; others are
Democrats.
37. GERON, supra note 34, at 206.
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racially cohesive bloc voting in favor of those candidates by Latino
38
voters. Thus, while White animosity towards Latino candidates may
be less than White animosity towards Black candidates, it is still
widespread, with consequences for Latino candidates and Latino
voting rights. Until White animosity towards Latinos is dramatically
reduced, equal political rights for Latinos may be achievable only
through continued use of majority-Latino districts.
THE LACK OF LATINO POLITICAL COHESIVENESS
Another crucial factor in the majority-minority district debate is
the degree to which Black or Latino voters constitute a cohesive
political group. Numerous studies have shown that Blacks are
motivated by feelings of racial linked fate and that they are a
relatively monolithic political group, regularly giving 80% or more of
39
their support to the Democratic Party. Latinos, however, are less
unified. A 2000 survey of Latino likely voters found that 56.6%
identified as Democrats, 24.5% identified as Republicans, and 13%
40
identified as independent. Data from the 2006 Latino National
Survey shows that Latino citizens identify as Democrats as compared
to Republicans by a ratio of 2.6 to 1, but there are significant
variations by national origin and location. Mexican Americans prefer
the Democratic Party by a ratio of 2.9 to 1, Puerto Ricans prefer the
Democratic Party by 3.2 to 1, and Cuban Americans prefer the
41
Republican Party by a ratio of 1.5 to 1. To speak of Latinos as a
cohesive voting bloc is therefore somewhat misleading; yet, the clear
trend is a preference for the Democratic Party. Cubans are the
exception, but they represent only 3.5% of the Latino population.
As the Cuban-descent population in the United States ages and
becomes less prominent—Cubans are about to be replaced by
Dominicans as the third-largest Latino national-origin subgroup
38. Yishaiya Abosch, Matt A. Barreto & Nathan D. Woods, An Assessment of Racially
Polarized Voting For and Against Latino Candidates, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER
107, 127–29 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007).
39. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICANAMERICAN POLITICS 77–88, 107 (1994); see generally PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES
(1999) (exploring the ramifications of the Democratic Party’s “capture” of black votes).
40. R. Michael Alvarez & Lisa García Bedolla, The Foundations of Latino Voter
Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election, 65 J. POL. 31, 31–49 (2003).
41. Luis Ricardo Fraga, et al., Patterns of Latino Partisanship: Foundations and the
Prospects for Change, at 8, presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science
Association (Mar. 19–21, 2009).
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(after Mexicans and Puerto Ricans)—the cohesiveness of the Latino
community will increase. While Cuban Americans as a whole continue
to prefer the Republican Party, younger Cuban Americans (those not
socialized by the Castro revolution) are more likely to prefer the
Democratic Party. At the same time, increasing numbers of nonCuban Latinos in Florida, generally Puerto Ricans, are turning the
state blue. In the November 2008 election, 57% of Latino voters in
Florida preferred the Democratic nominee, a result driven by Puerto
Ricans in central Florida. Overall, 67% of Latinos voted for Obama,
compared to 31% for John McCain. Although this does not approach
the 95% rate of support for Obama among Black voters, it is still a
stronger Democratic tendency than exists among White voters, who
42
were split 43% to 55% in favor of McCain.
Also important is the degree to which Latinos display ethnic
cohesiveness, and how partisanship and ethnicity play into their vote
choices. The tendency for Latino voters to prefer coethnic candidates
is dependent on individual levels of ethnic identification and whether
43
or not the candidates are copartisans. Spatial models of voting
predict that voters will choose the candidate who is closest to them on
issues and characteristics, but which arena is more salient to Latino
voters: ethnicity or partisanship? The evidence here is mixed. To
examine the pathways by which ethnicity influences vote choice, Scott
Graves and Jongho Lee conducted a survey just before a 1996 U.S.
Senate race in Texas between a Democratic Mexican American
44
challenger and an Anglo Republican incumbent. They found that
ethnicity plays a key role in vote choice, but it does so indirectly
through partisanship, ethnic-related issue positions, and candidate
evaluations. This suggests that partisanship is more important than
ethnicity, a conclusion supported by a natural experiment from
California’s 20th Congressional District in 2000, when an Anglo
Democrat incumbent was challenged by a Mexican American
45
Republican in a heavily Latino district (55%) in the Central Valley.
42. Mark Hugo Lopez, How Hispanics Voted in the 2008 Election, Pew Research Center,
Nov. 7, 2008, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1024/exit-poll-analysis-hispanics; Julia Preston, In Big
Shift, Latino Vote was Heavily for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/politics/07latino.html.
43. Victoria M. De Francesco Soto, Do Latinos Party All the Time? The Role of Shared
Ethnic Group Identity on Political Choice (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke
University), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10161/191.
44. Scott Graves & Jongho Lee, Ethnic Underpinnings of Voting Preference: Latinos and
the 1996 U.S. Senate Election in Texas, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 226, 226–36 (2000).
45. Melissa R. Michelson, Does Ethnicity Trump Party? Competing Vote Cues and Latino
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In this case, Latino voters chose to vote for their copartisan rather
than for their coethnic. Not only did the incumbent, Cal Dooley, easily
beat Richard Rodriguez in his bid for a sixth term, taking 52.4% of
the vote to Rodriguez’s 45.5%, but a poll of Latino voters just before
the election showed that 60% of respondents planned to vote for the
Anglo Democrat.
Other research indicates that ethnicity can be more important
than partisanship. For example, the Dade County, Florida mayoral
election of September 1996 included four major candidates: a Black
Republican, a Puerto Rican Democrat, a Cuban American Democrat,
46
and a Cuban American Independent. Over 80% of Black voters in
the county were registered as Democrats, whereas over 60% of
registered Latinos were Republicans. In other words, ethnicity and
partisanship were not aligned; yet, ethnicity was an overwhelmingly
more powerful predictor of vote choice than was partisanship. In a
poll conducted a week before the election, 97.4% of Latino
respondents supported one of the three Latino candidates and 82% of
African American respondents supported Arthur Teele, the Black
Republican, indicating a very strong correlation between
47
race/ethnicity and vote choice. By contrast, there was little
congruence between partisanship and vote choice: most Democrats
supported the Republican, while 79% of Republicans supported one
of the Democrats. Another example comes from a majority-Latino
district in California. In 1982, Anglo Republican John Rousselot
challenged the Latino Democrat incumbent, Marty Martinez, in
California’s heavily Latino 30th Congressional District. Martinez won
support from 86% of Latino Democrats, and won the race by a
comfortable margin. Two-thirds of Latino Republicans crossed party
lines to support their coethnic, even when voting for White
Republicans in other races (for governor and U.S. Senate) that did not
48
include Latino candidates.
In addition to the dominant influences of partisanship and
ethnicity, other factors such as issue positions and symbolic cues also

Voting Behavior, 4 J. POL. MARKETING 1, 1–25 (2005).
46. Kevin A. Hill, Dario V. Moreno & Lourdes Cue, Racial and Partisan Voting in a TriEthnic City: The 1996 Dade County Mayoral Election , 23 J. URB. AFF. 291, 297 (2001).
47. Id. at 302.
48. Bruce E. Cain & D. Roderick Kiewiet, Ethnicity and Electoral Choice: Mexican
American Voting Behavior in the California 30th Congressional District, 65 SOC. SCI. Q. 315
(1984).
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play a role. The nonpartisan Los Angeles city elections of 2001
included two competitive races for open seats in which one candidate
49
in each race was Latino and one was Anglo. In the mayoral race, the
Latino candidate (Antonio Villaraigosa) was more liberal than the
White candidate (Jim Hahn). In the race for city attorney, the Latino
candidate (Rocky Delgadillo) was more moderate than the White
candidate (Mike Feuer). While 82% of Latinos voted for Villaraigosa
and 79% for Delgadillo, only 66.2% voted for both Latino candidates.
In other words, a third of Latino voters chose one Anglo candidate
over a coethnic. Ethnicity was not solely responsible for vote choice;
ideology, issues, evaluation of the L.A. economy, personal economic
security, and education were also important determinants.
Conservatives were more likely to choose Hahn and Delgadillo. More
50
educated Latinos were more likely to vote for a White candidate.
Other research indicates that low-education Latinos are more
likely than high-education Latinos to use non-policy cues when
51
evaluating a candidate. For example, if a candidate speaks Spanish, is
Latino, promises to appoint Latino officials, uses Spanish-language
advertisements, or campaigns in Latino neighborhoods, then lowincome Latinos are more likely to evaluate the candidate favorably.
High-education Latinos are more likely to use policy and ideology
cues, as predicted by the classic spatial model.
In sum, while Latinos prefer to vote for coethnic candidates, they
do not constitute as cohesive a voting bloc as do African Americans,
particularly when faced with competing vote cues of partisanship or
issue positions. Yet, the tendency for Latinos to be willing to vote
against a coethnic due to competing vote cues should not be
overstated. Generally speaking, Latinos prefer to support Latino
49. Marisa A. Abrajano et al., A Natural Experiment of Race-Based and Issue Voting: The
2001City of Los Angeles Elections, 58 POL. RES. Q. 203, 203 (2005).
50. Id. at 212–13. Cf. Matt A. Barreto et al., Metropolitan Latino Political Behavior: Voter
Turnout and Candidate Preference in Los Angeles 27 J. URB. AFF. 71 (2005) (examining the
2001 Los Angeles elections). Metropolitan Latino Political Behavior notes that several factors
were present in the L.A. context that make ethnic-based voting more likely: enhanced Latino
cohesiveness and politicization in the wake of a series of anti-immigrant and anti-Latino
initiatives and rhetoric in the 1990s, the presence of a viable Latino candidate, and mobilization
drives conducted by Latino organizations. Id. at 73–78. Registered Latinos voted at higher rates
than non-Latinos and tended to support their coethnic (over 80% chose Villaraigosa). Id. at 76.
In contrast to turnout in the November 2000 presidential election, turnout in 2001 was linked to
the percentage of Latinos registered in a precinct. Id. at 83. In addition, precincts with higher
percentages of Latinos greatly favored Villaraigosa. Id. at 85–86.
51. Marisa Abrajano, Who Evaluates a Presidential Candidate by Using Non-Policy
Campaign Messages?, 58 POL. RES. Q. 55, 66 (2005).
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candidates, particularly if they hold a panethnic identity or have
feelings of Latino linked fate, both conditions that are increasingly the
case. Most Latinos are of Mexican or Puerto Rican descent, with
shared preferences for the Democratic Party and relatively consistent
issue positions, and can form cohesive voting blocs in favor of
Democratic Latino candidates. Cuban Americans, while distinctive in
their preference for the Republican Party, are geographically
concentrated in South Florida, and thus can form cohesive voting
blocs for local Republican Latino candidates. In either context, Latino
candidates running in majority-Latino districts can count on
considerable support from Latino voters.
THE LATINO ELECTORATE
The size of the Latino electorate does not accurately reflect the
size of the Latino population in the U.S. and is failing to keep pace
with the community’s rapid growth. From 2000 to 2008, the size of the
Latino population grew from 35.2 million to 46.8 million, increasing
52
from 12.5% of the population to 15.4%. Unlike Black populations—
which are generally concentrated in the South, generally concentrated
in segregated communities, and holding steady in comparison to nonBlack populations—Latino populations are moving in increasing
numbers to “new destinations,” generally integrating into
communities rather than creating new segregated communities, and
53
growing quickly in comparison to other populations. Latinos are the
fastest growing racial/ethnic group in the country, and are predicted
by the U.S. Census to make up a third of the national population by
54
2050.
Yet, Latinos only constituted 7% of the electorate in November
55
2008, continuing a longstanding pattern of low voter turnout. This is
generally due to a variety of factors: lower levels of citizenship; lower
52. PEW HISPANIC CENTER, STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF HISPANICS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2008 (2010) http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/factsheet.php?FactsheetID=58. In
comparison, Blacks grew from 12.0% of the population to 12.1%, while White non-Latinos
shrank from 69.1% to 65.4%. Id.
53. John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults & Reynolds Farley, Segregation of Minorities in the
Metropolis: Two Decades of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 1 (2004).
54. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury
(Aug.
14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/population/012496.html.
55. Douglas R. Hess & Jody Herman, Representational Bias in the 2009 Electorate,
PROJECT VOTE REPORT, http://projectvote.org/reports-on-the-electorate-/440.html. In
comparison, Blacks constituted 12% of the electorate in November 2008, Whites 76%. Id.
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levels of English-language proficiency; and the demographic nature of
the Latino community, including lower median levels of age, income,
56
and education—all of which are strong predictors of turnout. Even
among Latinos eligible to vote, participation lags behind that of
Whites and Blacks. In other words, part of the reason Latinos are
underrepresented is because they do not vote. Black citizens, in
contrast, generally vote more than would be predicted by their
socioeconomic characteristics and in levels approaching those of
Whites. The historic 2008 Presidential election was unusual, in that
Black turnout almost matched White turnout (65.2% and 66.1%,
57
respectively), but even in previous elections Black turnout was much
closer to White turnout than it was to Latino turnout. In 2006, 51.6%
of White individuals of voting age claimed to have participated in the
midterm elections, compared to 41% of Blacks and only 32.3% of
58
Latinos. In 2004, 67.2% of Whites and 60% of Blacks reported
59
voting, but only 47.2% of Latinos reported voting. And in contrast to
the spike in Black turnout in November 2008, only 49.9% of Latino
citizens made it to the polls (and only 31.6% of the voting-age
60
population). In California, the population has shifted over the past
three decades from 69% White to only 43% White, while the size of
the Latino population has more than doubled from 18% to 37%. Yet,
61
Whites are still 65% of the electorate, and Latinos only 21%.
Low Latino turnout is also due to asymmetries and deficiencies in
mobilization and outreach by political parties and candidates, which
62
have been found in multiple studies to be crucial to participation.

56. LOUIS DESIPIO, COUNTING ON THE LATINO VOTE: LATINOS AS A NEW ELECTORATE
(1996); Rodney E. Hero & Anne G. Campbell, Understanding Latino Political Participation:
Exploring the Evidence from the Latino National Political Survey, 18 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 129,
129–32 (1996).
57. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008
Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports: Data Shows Significant Increases Among
Hispanic, Black, and Young Voters (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/index.html.
58. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2006, June
2008, http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf.
59. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004, March
2006, http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf.
60. Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, supra note 57.
61. Press Release, Field Research Corporation, The Changing California Electorate (Part
1): Large-Scale Demographic Changes in California’s Electorate From What it Was Thirty
Years Ago (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2309.pdf.
62. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN M. HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36–37 (1993); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS, (1995); LATINOS IN THE 2008 ELECTION (Rodolfo O.
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While non-partisan community organizations such as the National
Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials and the
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project expend considerable
resources every election season to mobilize Latino voters, their efforts
cannot compensate for the general lack of outreach by Democrats
and Republicans, who tend to focus their efforts on likely voters. In
July 2008, then-candidate Barack Obama made headlines with his
pledge to spend $20 million to reach out to Latino voters. This was
double what the GOP had spent on similar efforts in 2000, but less
than 3% of the candidate’s overall campaign budget of $744.9 million.
The bottom line is that despite the Latino community’s growing
size and geographic scope, various demographic characteristics and
chronic neglect by major party candidates and organizations combine
to keep Latino turnout low. This limits the ability of Latinos to win
elections in districts where they do not constitute a majority (or
sometimes a supermajority) of the population, and severely limits
their ability to “elect representatives of their choice” in coalitional or
influence districts. The growth of the Latino share of the electorate
continues to lag behind the growth of the Latino population. Until
this disconnect between population size and share of the electorate
changes, either as a result of partisan realignment or gradual
population shifts, Latino representation will continue to rely heavily
on the existence of majority-Latino districts.
THE FUTURE OF THE MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICT
Majority-minority districts are not without their own problems.
Districts that are drawn to support the ability of a politically cohesive
Latino (or Black) community should not be so safe as to allow an
incumbent to serve without accountability. As noted by Ellen Katz,
“the right to vote must encompass something more than the ability to
63
cast a ballot for a preordained victor.” Yet, majority-minority
districts remain important to the Latino community for several major
reasons. The size and political participation of the Latino population
is growing, but it still lags far behind that of Whites, and thus so does
Latino representation. Latino political power is limited due to the
community’s youth and large proportion of non-citizens, both of
which contribute to low Latino voter turnout. A general lack of
de la Garza et al.. eds., forthcoming 2010).
63. Katz, supra note 33, at 1166.
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outreach by major political parties and organizations, including
deficiencies in candidate recruitment and voter mobilization, further
contribute to low Latino voter turnout. In addition, while racially
polarized voting by Whites is less problematic for Latinos than for
Blacks, it still exists, and is less compensated for by bloc voting in the
Latino community because of the Latino community’s political and
ideological diversity. Thus, even when Latinos constitute a majority or
even a plurality of a district, their ability to elect a representative of
their choice is limited. Given that representatives are expected to
serve all members of their geographic constituencies and not just
those with the franchise, majority-minority Latino districts remain
crucial. In addition, descriptive representation of Latinos has
numerous benefits to the community and to society as a whole,
including increased substantive representation, trust in government,
and participation.
Georgia v. Ashcroft’s conclusion that coalition and influence
64
districts are sufficient to ensure minority voting rights may be true
for Blacks, but it is not true for Latinos. Support for proportional
Latino representation thus requires the continued use of majorityLatino districts and the protection of the right of Latino citizens to
elect coethnic representatives, at least for the time being. In the
“color-blind” future, majority-minority districts may no longer be
necessary to guarantee equal representation and power to historically
underrepresented groups in the United States, but we have not yet
arrived at the end of the rainbow.

64. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479–83 (2003).

